The last years have seen a surge of scandals in financial intermediation. This paper argues that the agency structure inherent to most forms of financial intermediation gives rise to conflicts of interest. Though this does not excuse scandalous behavior it points out market imperfections. There are four types of conflicts of interest: personal-individual, personalorganizational, impersonal-individual, and finally, impersonal-organizational conflicts.
intermediary and its client(s) and the conflicts that are specific to that relationsship.
1 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. a) Since our analysis of conflicts of interests in financial intermediation builds upon a contractual principal agent relationship, we will begin by introducing the principal agent paradigm. b) This section is followed by a description of the main actors in financial intermediation. We then propose a structure for the analysis of conflicts of interest and advance examples from recent financial scandals. c) The concluding section gives a short overview of possible solution mechanisms.
The principal agent paradigm as context of analysis
A financial intermediary goes between the users and suppliers of financial resources (Carmichael and Pomerleano 2002: p. 3), a relationship that can be modelled as a principal agent relationship. The financial intermediary (the agent) acts on behalf of its client (mostly dispersed, uninformed investors -the principal) without risking its own assets. Its superior knowledge allows it to act more efficiently and to save costs (e.g. transaction and information costs through specialized technical knowledge and economies of scale). Principal and agent enter a contractual relation in which the intermediary provides certain services -such as transaction and fiduciary services but also advisory and management services -to its client.
These services are more or less concretely specified. In return, the client pays the intermediary a fee which might follow a fixed rate or depend on the intermediary´s performance.
The model assumes that the principal has an information deficit compared to the agent.
Their interests might differ substantially. The agent is usually modelled as a self interested individual who is trying to maximize profit (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976 for a detailed discussion of the concept). There are three types of problems according to the model: hidden action, hidden knowledge and hidden information. The first implies that the principal is not able to fully observe the agent´s actions and cannot be perfectly monitored (at least not without costs). This might give way to moral hazard on the agent´s side. It is not possible to completely specify the contract between principal and agent as not all states of nature are to be fully known ex ante. This problem is aggravated by the fact that there might be information about the contractual environment which is known to the agent but not to the principal (hidden information). The last problem is that of hidden knowledge: some features (e.g. the other
clients, compensation scheme of the employees etc.) -or more generally the incentive structure -of the agent are not fully known to the principal and the agent per se has no incentive to disclose them. Building upon this concept of principal agent theory, two modifications for the application to financial intermediation are proposed.
Modification 1, Professional ethics:
The relationship between intermediary and client in financial intermediation goes beyond the general principal agent relationsship that for instance exists between a manager within a corporation and the owner of a corporation. The agents customarily are held with the legal authority and duty to make decisions regarding financial matters on the clients´ behalf. Safeguarding the clients' assets, the financial intermediary has a custodian role with broader public implications. Therefore, it has been argued that professionals in financial intermediation have professional duties in this agency relationship equalling those of, for example, accountants, lawyers and medical staff. The three features characterizing a profession are, according to Boatright (1999: p. 42 ), i) a specialised body of knowledge ii) a high degree of organization and self-regulation, and finally iii) a commitment to public service.
He comes to the conclusion that although the pursuit of self interest is more prevailing in financial intermediation, it still requires a special professional ethic due to its fiduciary function. Boatright (1999: p. 6 ) subsumes the obligations of financial intermediaries under the following:
"The main duties of professionals are to perform services with competence and due care, to avoid conflicts of interest, to preserve confidentiality, and to uphold the ideals of the profession". Thus, the agency relationship is intensified by a special trust structure.
Modification 2, Increased number of principals: Standard principal-agent theory was developed to address the problem of diverging interests of the principal and its agent. However, in the case of financial intermediation it is not only the problem of opposing personal interests.
There are many cases in which the agent has to to act for two principals with possibly diverging if not opposing interests (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) . Thus, it requires some modifications of basic principal agent theory. The principal can no longer be modelled as a unitary actor.
There are two cases that can be distinguished. In the first, the agent sells the same kind of service to different clients. In the second, different kinds of services are offered to different clients. The agent faces a problem of how to weigh the different if not opposing interests of the principals and accordingly, how to best act in the interest of all of the clients.
The landscape of financial intermediation -actors and activities
Traditionally, capital markets are viewed as means of an efficient allocation of capital in matching capital suppliers (lenders) and users (borrowers). However, capital markets are far from perfect and thus financial intermediaries are needed to improve the efficiency of capital allocation, e.g. by reducing information and/or transaction costs or by creating liquidity (French and Leyshon 2004 ). Yet, financial intermediaries as profit-making organizations are more than neutral go-betweens. In the following, the landscape of financial intermediation will be outlined and general characteristics of the actors will be depicted. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the agency structure of financial intermediation.
We distinguish between three types of financial intermediaries: institutional investors, `pure intermediaries´ such as brokers and investment banks, and commercial banks. These institutions have a different standing in financial intermediation. operating with large amounts of money, allow smaller investors to better diversify risk, a process which is termed portfolio transformation (French and Leyshon 2004: p. 268) . Besides, as operating on an economies of scale basis, institutional investors help to reduce transaction costs (especially trading but also information costs and other costs). They usually make a profit by charging a fee. A defining characteristic is that the risk is still borne by the investor which gives the manager a fiduciary role, acting as an agent in the transactions (Carmichael and Pomerleano 2002: p. 93 ). The following analysis will concentrate on mutual funds. In contrast to mutual funds, pension funds as the second most prominent group of institutional investors are heavily regulated if not even managed by public sector entities. Their specific situation gives rise to special problems which we will not address in our paper. A mutual fund raises money by selling shares to investors who receive an equity position in the fund and in each of its underlying securities. The fund invests into a group of assets as it is stated by the terms stipulated in the trust deed. The money raised is invested by the fund into a wide range of assets, such as shares, bonds, derivatives, and money market instruments. Typically, shareholders are free to sell their shares at any time, although the price of a share in a mutual fund fluctuates daily, depending upon the performance of the assets held by the fund. The relationship between mutual fund company and investors equals a trust structure. 2 Above all their design as long term savings vehicles gives mutual funds special obligations towards their investors/principals and the wider public in general. However, institutional investors also act as principals insofar as they give orders to brokers and investment banks.
Brokers and investment banks are pure intermediaries inasmuch as they serve to reduce information and transaction costs without transforming the asset class (French and Leyshon 2004: p. 268) . Investment banks and brokers mediate between buyers and sellers of securities (bonds and shares), the former on the primary market (floating of shares and debt underwriting), the latter on secondary markets (where assets are resold and repurchased). An investment bank acts as an underwriter and thus an agent for corporations and governments issuing securities. In addition, they might facilitate mergers and acquisitions, private equity placements and corporate restructuring. They do not have the custodian role of traditional banks or asset managers but instead certain other obligations towards their clients as e.g. confidentiality. A broker maintains markets for previously issued securities. Thus, whereas investment banks come from the side of the corporation and should try to make the best deal for their corporate clients (i.e. raising capital to attain the lowest costs), brokers trade on the secondary market and should execute transactions by making the best deals for investors (individual and institutional). Frequently, both give additional advisory services to their clients and both functions (underwriting/investment banking and broking) are localized in one entity.
Commercial banks accept deposits and make loans thus mediating between borrowers and lenders (Valdez and Wood 2003: p. 61 The above is only a rough sketch of the agency structure(s) in financial intermediation. In reality the picture is often more complex with many more actors involved. However, as has become apparent even in this simplistic model, a modification of the traditional principal-agent model is justifiable on the grounds of the diverse relationships in financial intermediation. In the next part, we will turn our attention to conflicts of interest in this setting.
A categorization of conflicts of interest
Having outlined the basic principal agent theory and its modifications requisite to apply it to financial intermediation and having described the landscape of financial intermediation we will now turn to characterizing the types of conflicts of interest that might or do occur between and within the actors depicted above. To streamline the following discussion, problems which are not specific to the financial industry are left out. This would be, for instance, conflicts of interest in the shareholder -board of directors relationship or the design of "ethical products"
(as social and ecological responsible investment in case of financial services).
We will focus on problems in financial intermediation that have come up over the last years and add illustrating examples from the recent spate of financial scandals where available.
Our choice of incidents is ad hoc. We mainly take those that have recently had a lot of media coverage. However, the main aim is to show what types of conflicts of interest systematically occur and prevail in financial intermediation. We do not analyze the quantitative impact.
Nevertheless, to develop useful regulatory tools this should be done in the future to see which problems must be addressed. 204) we will demonstrate on the basis of recent scandals that all four conflicts do systematically occur in financial intermediation.
One conflict of interest that is especially stressed by Boatright (1999: p. 86ff .) arises in personal trading. Given the huge amounts of money they invest, mutual fund managers influence the prices of assets by trading on behalf of the fund or even by the mere public announcements by which they recommend assets or caution about them. Personal trading in these assets might induce manager to put their own interests above that of the fund´s investors. Therefore, it can be qualified as a personal-individual conflict. The heavy regulation of mutual fund activities might reduce but cannot exclude the occurrence of personal-individual conflicts of interest. Recently, the SEC accused top managers of one the largest mutual fund companies in the USA, Putnam Investment for being involved in personal trading (CBSnews.com, 2003 ). Yet, personal trading also arises within other financial intermediaries as is the case, for instance, when a broker not only executes trades for his clients but also on his own behalf on information from clients.
Another kind of personal-individual conflict of interest is laddering. Laddering describes investment bank's or investment bankers' efforts to motivate clients to buy IPO shares in the first days of trade (the after market that immediately follows the IPO) by promising preferential treatment in the share allocation of future IPOs, thus making the IPO a bigger success. In the recent wave of financial scandals, Morgan Stanley, for instance, has been found to be involved in laddering with some of its most important investment clients (Smith, 2003) . information from foreign markets that is not taken into account by pricing the fund´s shares). In a recent settlement, Gary L. Pilgrim and Harold J. Baxter, founders of a mutual fund paid $ 160 million to settle charges for extensive market timing activities in the 1990s at the expense of their investors (Masters, 2004) . These activities are opposed to a mutual fund's design as a longterm investment vehicle as they force it to remain more liquid than it would otherwise be, reducing its performance. Funds clearly forbid market timing. As Mahoney (2004: p. 174) emphasizes, it is mainly the "deliberate attempt to exploit stale prices […that] defines `improper´ market timing". Zitzewitz (2003: p. 246) estimates that market timing leads to losses of about USD 5 billion for ordinary, long-term investors per year.
Allowing favored investors to trade after the new fixing of the price but at the previous conditions, is called late trading and usually forbidden by the law. However, it has been done by some larger investors with the support of fund management. These practices usually occur as a favor to big (i.e. mostly other institutional) clients, damaging small investors. Thus, clients with different bargaining power are treated differently. These conflicts of interest are impersonalindividual in so far as it were single professionals participate in the agreements. However, that conflict can potentially turn into one of the impersonal-organizational kind (in some companies, this unethical behavior seems to be common practice).
A third example of impersonal-individual conflicts is spinning. Spinning describes the practice of investment banks to distribute highly sought after shares among preferential clients, to attract future underwriting business. Credit Suisse First Boston and others have been involved in a recent scandal of spinning, offering corporate executives preferred access to shares in IPOs in hopes of getting some investment banking business in return (Smith, Craig and Solomon 2003) . Solomon offered Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of WorldCom Inc. a preferred access to a widely oversubscribed telecommunication IPO in 1999. Ebbers sold the shares within days and made a profit of more than $ 11 million. WorldCom Inc. at that time was an investment banking client of Solomon (Craig, 2002) . This conflict of interest is impersonalindividual in so far as that preferential treatment was given to certain clients above others to increase the firm's future profits.
c) Personal-organizational conflict. Conflicts of interest can occur in the context of fund share evaluation or the cost structure of a fund. Fees and expense ratios are not always disclosed in detail which leaves the investor ignorant of the amount payed for the fund´s management.
This allows fund management to bundle commissions and to pay for the trades executed by stockbrokers with soft commissions. Those are payments to brokers in exchange for research and other services besides trade execution, including trading or information systems and preferential treatment in initial public offerings whose costs are passed on to the clients (Schwartz and Steil 2002: p. 44 ). Instead of adding them to the management fees, they show up in a lower performance of the fund, thus giving a more competitive picture of the fund´s fee structure. Recent findings show that even after subtracting the costs of "soft" services, trading costs are higher than necessary which might be acerbated by the fund manager´s incentive to increase the frequency of trades (Schwartz and Steil 2002: p. 45 ). This type of conflict is personal-organizational as it is caused by the profit-making aims of the fund management, embedded in the organizational structure of soft payments.
Analysts' research is another source of personal-organizational conflict of interest. In (Smith, Craig and Solomon, 2003) . For misleading investors through dubious research, Morgan Stanley paid $ 125 million for settling the charges (Solomon, 2003) . These are only some of the charges that have been brought up in the last few years. To be able to give advisory services, these institutions often rely on their internal research departments. This structure provides for conflicts: analysts´ research, especially their earnings forecasts might be influenced by their desire to attract investment banking clients. This problem in reality has been acerbated by wrong incentives laid out in the compensation structure.
Analysts´ bonuses in many cases used to depend on the overall performance of the firm, or even worse, on underwriting profit. In fact, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2003) find that analysts´ earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to attract investment banking clients. However, they add that this effect is mitigated in international markets. Recently, a drastic example occurred within Merrill Lynch where e-mail traffic documented that analysts called stock "crap"
and "junk" internally but praised it externally (Frieswick, 2002) . This is a personalorganisational type of conflict of interest that is inherent in the firm's organizational structure.
Analysts might have access to insider information due to their firm´s involvement in investment banking procedures and exploit this knowledge for their organization´s profit (or their own via the mechanism of compensation schemes).
d) Impersonal-organizational conflict. Connected lending describes a conflict of interest in the context of a commercial bank's function of accepting deposits and making loans. This signifies that banks are simultaneously lenders and borrowers, which is a potential source for conflict of interest in itself. However, in many cases they assume additional functions such as monitoring the loans granted and advisory services to debtors. This might result in having a position in the board of the debtor company, a case that is referred to as connected lending.
Those board connections provide an area of conflict. Though they help monitoring (and reducing the costs of information), the lending policy might become biased as connected loans might be treated more favorably (e.g. by better conditions for rolling over debts). It is a impersonal-organizational type of conflict of interest in two respects. On the one hand, corporate clients are given preferential treatment over depositors. This conflict is due to the different services a bank provides. The monitoring efficiency argument does not hold in cases where connected lending leads to sup-optimal debt recovery policies as, for example, holding on to bad borrowers. On the other hand, among the borrowers, those with board connections are favored. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) find that board linkages are frequent in the US. The
Worldbank argues that connected lending was one of the main drivers of the Mexican macroeconomic crisis (Tequila crisis) of 1995. Failing banks often had made poor loans to politically powerful groups that were linked to the bank owners (Worldbank, 2005) . However, as Kroszner and Strahan (2001) conclude there is sufficent regulation to avoid potential conflicts of interest in the USA as opposed to the situation in countries with weaker financial regulation. Table 2 reflects the types of conflict that occur along our proposed matrix. Having dealt with those sub-entities in financial intermediation the reader might ask what happens in the case of universal banking and financial conglomerates. Roughly defined in this context, a universal bank unites all the above characterized roles and functions and more. Consequently, it provides a vast field for (potential) conflicts of interest in its organizational structure. However, most of the concrete problems that are to arise have already been discussed related to the other intermediaries.
Thus, we will not analyze universal banking separately (For more detailed information we refer to Crockett et al., 2004.) . Table 2 around here
Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of financial intermediation would go beyond the scope of this paper. However, taking it as a given phenomenon, we agree with Boatright (2000: p. 201 ) that "conflicts of interest are built into the structure of our financial institutions and could be avoided only with great difficulty.
[…] The challenge, therefore is not to prevent conflicts of interest in financial services but to manage them in a workable financial system." But in order to manage them, one must be capable of understanding them. Our categorization might serve to clarify the characteristics of the forms of conflict that may occur and it may help to develop strategies to cope with the unavoidable risks of their happening. We will conclude our paper by a short discussion on the the third form of conflicts of interest, actual and potential conflicts of interest.
Keeping potential conflicts potential -Fighting legal and moral misconduct
As we have seen, in theory as well as in practice, there are two major roots of conflicts of interest: those for which the standard principal agent paradigm applies and those arising in a slightly modified setting with two or more principals. In the latter case, agents are tempted to better serve the interests of some of their principals than others. This may lie in the individual interest of the intermediary or one of its employees or be due to the organizational structure.
Conflicts of interest are inherent in the system. While the exploitation of conflicts of interest can be criticized, their mere existence can neither be condemned per se nor be avoided without great difficulty or negative side effects for the efficiency of financial intermediation. Individuals and institutions alike have to make their own judgements to find ways to cope with the potential transition from potential to actual conflicts of interest. What can be done to deal with the systemic compliance and integrity threats that are, for instance, linked to asymmetric information or bargaining power? What provokes the actual misconduct of and within organizations? There is a broad discussion in the literature, examining the role of leadership (e.g. Dickson, Smith, Grojean & Ehrhardt, 2001) , the development of individual moral reasoning (Weber, 1991) , organizational structures (James, 2000) , the interplay between individual and situational variables (Trevino, 1996) , or the role of fairness (e.g. Blader & Tyler, 2003) in explaing and dealing with deviant behavior in legal and ethical terms.
The following sub-sections briefly touch on three prominent remedies (see Boatright, 2000: 214ff. and Crockett et al., 2004) , market discipline, disclosure and market conduct rules (self-imposed or by government regulation). Stating the limits of a merely compliance-driven approach to conflicts of interest, we additionally discuss integrity-driven activities, which corporations in the financial industry might adopt or strengthen. There are no ready made remedies for each type of conflict of interest. Obviously, only a combination of mechanisms can sufficiently deal with them.
Competition and market discipline: Competition among providers of financial intermediation helps in avoiding conflict of interest as it increases clients´ bargaining power.
However, though this is true in the standard principal agent setting (where many agents compete for the attention of one principal), it does not necessarily respond to the above described concrete decision-making situations with more than one principal. In these situations, principals compete for the attention of the agent. Besides, competition among agents remains limited.
Though, for instance, in the case of broker commissions, increasing competition is related to reduced (transaction) fees, in many cases the missing transparency of structures prevents workable competition and weakens the disciplinary power of the market. This could result in an inability to understand the significance of disclosed fields of tension. On the other hand, and this is even more probable, only a few firms would be prepared to take this proactive stance, fearing competitive disadvantages compared to other intermediaries that remain silent about potential conflicts. In addition, many actors lack moral motivation. As we have seen, it is quite easy in many cases to tell whether a behaviour is adequate or inadequate (which does not necessarily mean illegal). However, some intermediaries actually seem to specialize on exploiting regulatory loopholes and acting in grey areas. Depending on the goodwill of financial intermediaries apparently is not enough.
Market conduct rules and regulation: To create a level playing field, disclosure should be made mandatory for all market participants. Increased transparency can result from industry self-regulation or government legislature. In most countries, this is done in a two layer system: self-regulation institutions that are overseen by the state. Apart from rendering disclosure obligatory, regulation has an important role in setting standards but also must be endowed with power to enforce its principles. The heaviest form of government regulation is to mandate structural reforms. In the US, this was first introduced by the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act which separated commercial banks from investment banks/brokerages to reduce conflicts of interest.
However, this law has been weakened by subsequent laws and therefore, it is now possible for a financial institution to offer banking and broker/dealer services simultaneously. Recently, in the US, separationist tendencies have been reinforced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. It prescribes an internal separation -a Chinese wall -between research and investment banking activities. Nevertheless, it is difficult for governments to regulate financial intermediation in a proactive way, especially as domestic as well as international spheres become more and more inseparable. Thus, the main responsibility in providing a viable financial system still lies with financial intermediaries themselves.
Integrity programs: Paine (1995) has pointed to the limits of a merely law and controldriven ethics program (compliance) and proposed a value-based approach that rather builds upon creating and fostering a moral climate of shared values (integrity). The idea behind her proposal is the assumption that intrinsically motivated employees might show a more stable and calculable behavior than those employees who are trained to follow legal demands and who feel threatened by sanctions. Explicit incentives or sanctions can even lead to an erosion of the moral climate, e.g. by reducing the level of mutual trust (Frey, 1997) . Distrust towards employees that is displayed in sophisticated control and monitoring mechanisms can become self-fulfilling and provoke the very behavior the mechanisms seek to prevent (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) . Integrity programs are strongly linked to the example and commitment of top management (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999) . Integrity does not replace compliance but strengthens its effects. "Case-based research and theoretical research have suggested that valueoriented programs or combined values and compliance programs should be more effective" (Weaver et al., 1999, p. 55) .
A wide range of conflicts of interest exists in the contractual relationships of financial intermediation. Principal agent theory and its modifications provide a relatively good analytical tool to explain the underlying tensions and to classify the conflicts that arise. However, there is no standard solution to these problems and regulatory tools are consequently diverse. More research has to be carried out to better tailor regulation. Nevertheless, the actors involved in financial intermediation themselves have to act to reduce the potential for conflicts. On the one hand this implies that investors should not blindly trust their agents or, even worse, allow for shady practices as long as the gain is sufficient. It has been very characteristic, that most of the scandals have erupted after markets have gone down. On the other hand, financial intermediaries should be fully aware of their special trust position. Accordingly, organizationsas well as the individuals in them -should act with the necessary due diligence and take a proactive role in managing conflict.
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